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Millions of lives are saved each year thanks to the production 
and distribution of increasingly innovative pharmaceuticals.  These 
technological advances are not created without cost, however; the 
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most heavily regulated and 
must expend substantial time and money researching and 
developing products that will be safe and effective for public 
consumption.1  As a result, the pharmaceutical industry relies more 
than any other on the patent system as a means of ensuring returns 
for its substantial investments.2  While pharmaceutical companies 
                                                                                                             
1 See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420 (2006); Joseph A. 
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003). 
2 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 717, 721 (2005); Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America: 
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are incentivized to innovate through market exclusivity in patent 
protection, the enormous public benefits they provide demand 
effective and meaningful protection for the innovators in this 
industry. 
However, the pharmaceutical industry faces many obstacles:  
the United States is suffering one of the largest drug shortages in 
history; research and development costs for pharmaceutical 
companies are rising; the number of new drugs entering the market 
is declining; and pharmaceutical innovation is stifled.3  Many of 
these setbacks appear directly linked to the difficulties drug 
companies face when entering a new product into the market, as 
they are challenged by the interplay of the patent system and 
federal approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”).4  The ever-increasing cost—in both time and money—of 
successfully receiving patent protection and FDA approval of a 
new drug excessively burdens drug companies and suppresses their 
incentive for innovation.5  Although critics have characterized the 
patent system as the road to profit and the FDA regulations as a 
speed-bump on that road, it is actually the conflict created by the 
combination of the two systems—systems that can only be 
constructive if they can effectively work in tandem—that hinder 
the market-entry process.6  Significantly, the timeline of market 
entry renders it impossible for these companies to receive the total 
benefit of their patented market-exclusivity because of the 
stringent standards that govern the process.7  Pharmaceutical 
companies must decide whether to pursue innovation despite the 
                                                                                                             
Tensions Between Food and Drug Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 
404 (2012). 
3 See Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big 
Pharma to Change, FORBES, Aug. 11, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-
the-future-of-medicine. 
4 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351–52 (2007). 
5 See id. 
6 See generally Lewin, supra note 2, at 403 (discussing the conflicts created by the 
interplay of the FDA approval process and the patent system, and noting their effect on 
market entry). 
7 See Ronald L. Desrosiers, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground in the 
Control of Health Care Costs, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 120–21 (1989). 
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certainty they will not receive maximum rewards, limit their 
medical advances to products that they are positive will receive 
patentability and likely gain federal approval, or simply leave the 
industry and invest elsewhere.  Worse, these companies may be 
tempted to enter into the newly-regulated compounding 
pharmaceutical market, one that is notoriously less stable but may 
guarantee a better turnaround for their investments.  Consequently, 
it is ultimately consumers who suffer, because they are denied 
innovative medical discoveries, required to pay larger sums to get 
their hands on the available drugs in an increasingly scarce market, 
or are forced to obtain drugs from a less reliable industry.  Though 
patent reform and FDA regulatory review are topics that have been 
proposed numerous times, never has a proposal for change been so 
urgent as it is now. 
Part I of this Note will provide background information on 
market entry, discussing both the patent system as well as the FDA 
approval requirements.  Part I will also analyze the difficulties that 
pharmaceutical companies face when attempting market entry of a 
new drug because of the intricate challenges inherent in FDA 
approval and the patent application process.  Further, this Part will 
provide a brief background on the current state of the 
pharmaceutical industry, which would benefit from more fluidity. 
Part II of this Note will address the conflicts engendered by 
both the requirements for patentability and the problems with the 
effective patent protection afforded once a patent application is 
approved.  This Part will separately address each of the three 
requirements for patentability, and discuss the problems they 
create as applied to pharmaceuticals.  Last, this Part will discuss 
the conflict arising from the length of the patent term as it relates 
to the pharmaceutical industry due to the timeline of creating a 
successful drug product. 
Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that pharmaceutical 
protections should be revisited to render them more able to serve 
the interests of drug companies and consumers alike.  This Part 
will also recommend ways to reform the FDA regulatory process 
to generate a more efficient system for the pharmaceutical industry 
with respect to both market entry and market exclusivity while 
preserving the incentive to innovate. 
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I. A BACKGROUND ON MARKET ENTRY IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY: THE PATENT PROCESS, REGULATORY DRUG APPROVAL, 
AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 
Pharmaceuticals in the United States constitute a multi-billion 
dollar industry, which provides value to the public through 
innovative technologies and essential drugs.  In order to appreciate 
the discussion of pharmaceutical protection, one must understand 
how pharmaceuticals enter the market and the steps each drug must 
undergo to achieve market entry.  These steps include both the 
patent process as well as approval from the FDA.  Additionally, in 
order to understand the necessity of revisiting the protections 
surrounding the pharmaceutical industry—and, specifically, the 
incentives in place to fuel pharmaceutical innovation—one must 
have a greater understanding of the current state of the industry 
and certain prominent trends therein. 
A. The Federally Regulated Pharmaceutical Industry 
The commercial drug industry enhances the public good by 
providing health services.  While the Food and Drug 
Administration was created with intent to regulate medicines and 
vaccines in the early 1900s, it was not until the 1930s that the FDA 
as it is now known took effect.8  In 1938, the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act was created to mandate the safety of 
pharmaceuticals and laid out the requirements for pre-marketing 
approval and proof of clinical testing with respect to the 
pharmaceutical industry.9  Subsequent drug regulations continued 
to follow, including laws that separated over-the-counter drugs 
from prescription drugs,10 mandated that large-scale manufacturers 
abide by registration requirements and stricter safety and efficacy 
                                                                                                             
8 See Hasumati Rahalkar, Historical Overview of Pharmaceutical Industry and Drug 
Regulatory Affairs, S11 PHARMACEUTICAL REG. AFF. 002, 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.omicsgroup.org/journals/historical-overview-of-pharmaceutical-industry-and-
drug-regulatory-affairs-2167-7689.S11-002.pdf. 
9 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012)). 
10 Durham–Humphrey Amendment, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (current 
version at 21 U.S.C. §353). 
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standards,11 and endeavored to incentivize pharmaceutical 
innovators by means of patent protections.12  Due to these 
regulations, drug companies must make substantial investments to 
produce and develop a new drug for market entry, a process that 
results in famously high costs to consumers.13  Although the 
pharmaceutical industry must necessarily rely on the government 
to grant the market approval it needs to make its drugs 
commercially available, it has also notoriously relied heavily on 
patent protection to ensure a high rate of profit to make up for 
development costs.14  For years, patents, which have traditionally 
been viewed as a “fundamental incentive to innovative activities in 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology,”15 have acted in tandem with 
the federal regulatory approval process to shape the pharmaceutical 
industry as it exists today. 
1. Market Entry Overview 
Pharmaceutical companies that wish to bring a new drug to the 
market must engage in a multistep process that includes both 
receiving a patent and gaining approval from the FDA.  While 
patent approval affords protection to pharmaceuticals that are new 
and useful—thereby enabling a competitive advantage and market 
exclusivity—the FDA grants approval only to those drugs that are 
safe and effective. 
All processes combined, the market-entry process is 
notoriously costly and timely.16  A 2013 Forbes report tracked 
                                                                                                             
11 U.S. Kefauver Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (current 
version at 21 U.S.C.§§ 301-92). 
12 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §271(e) (2012)). 
13 See Paul D. Jorgensen, Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Agenda, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 561, 563 (2013). 
14 See M.J. Murray, The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Study in Corporate Power, 4 
INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 625, 637 (1974). 
15 F. Pammoli et al., Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A European 
Perspective, prepared for the Directorate General Enterprise of the European 
Commission, November 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/
healthcare/files/docs/comprep_nov2000_en.pdf. 
16 See Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 251 (2013). 
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ninety-eight publicly traded biotechnology and drug companies 
over the past decade with data from the Innothink Center for 
Research in Biomedical Innovation and found that the average 
cost-per-drug for a pharmaceutical company to introduce between 
eight and thirteen drugs into the market was $5.3 billion.17  A 
different study from researchers at Tufts University revealed that 
the average cost-per-drug for new-drug development is roughly 
$802 million.18  Though initially challenged, the Tufts study was 
later confirmed by further estimates, which revealed even higher 
calculated averages for companies introducing one drug into the 
market.19  Furthermore, the time spent on patent approval 
combined with the time spent conducting clinical trials to satisfy 
FDA approval can result in a market-entry process that lasts as 
long as fourteen years.20 
a) The Patent System: The General Process and the Patent 
Term 
Patent law has been described as the “classic legal embodiment 
of innovation.”21  Few industries, if any, rely as heavily on the 
patent system and the protection afforded thereunder as the 
                                                                                                             
17 See Herper, supra note 3 (explaining that the high costs pharmaceutical companies 
spend per drug must also account for encountered failures during the R&D process). 
18 See DiMasi et al., supra note 1, at 166. 
19 See Adams & Brantner, supra note 1, at 420 (estimating an average R&D cost per 
drug of $868 million); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of 
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
469, 469, 475 (2007) (estimating an R&D cost per drug of $1.24 billion for large-
molecule biopharmaceuticals); see also Jim Gilbert et al., Rebuilding Big Pharma’s 
Business Model, 21 IN VIVO: BUS. & MED. REP. 10, (2003), available at 
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuilding_big_pharma.pdf (adding 
that these costs notably include not only successful drug products and clinical trial 
outcomes, but also failed drug products and all failed attempts). 
20 See Dennis Fernandez, James Huie & Justin Hsu, The Interface of Patents with the 
Regulatory Drug Approval Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market 
Entry, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL 
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 969 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval], available at 
www.ipHandbook.org (noting that the FDA approval process typically takes between ten 
and twelve years, and the patent approval process takes an average of three years). 
21 See Lewin, supra note 2, at 412. 
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pharmaceutical industry.22  The invention of pharmaceuticals is 
driven by the security that patent protection provides in ensuring 
that the company is both compensated for its investments in 
research and development (“R&D”) and made profitable by its 
competitive advantage in the form of exclusivity.  This protection 
for innovation has significant social value because the security 
granted to pharmaceutical companies is meant to fuel innovation 
and thereby provides health benefits for the public. 
With respect to the pharmaceutical industry, patents provide 
legal protection for the new medicines discovered by research-
based pharmaceutical companies.  Patents give their owners the 
right to use and exclude others from using an invention or 
discovery for a limited period of time,23 which in turn enables the 
pharmaceutical innovator the ability to recoup her investment.  
Pharmaceutical patents are granted to “compositions of matter” 
that are “new and useful,”24 and are subject to the conditions that 
the invention or discovery is both novel25 and non-obvious.26  
Importantly, patent-holders must fully disclose the research and 
science underlying their discoveries,27 which makes such 
information available to the public at large.  The average patent 
pendency—the time between when an application is filed and 
when the patent is either approved or denied—is about two and a 
half years.28  Approved patented products receive market 
exclusivity for 20 years from the date that the application of the 
patent was filed.29  However, patents are issued very early on in a 
product’s development; for pharmaceutical innovations, they are 
                                                                                                             
22 See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 721; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the 
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 507 (2009); Robert Weissman, A Long, 
Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual 
Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World 
Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069, 1075–85 (1996). 
23 See Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014). 
24 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
25 Id. § 102. 
26 Id. § 103. 
27 See id. 
28 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2013). 
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
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issued before the clinical trial testing required for FDA approval 
has occurred.30  As a result, the effective market-exclusivity term 
for pharmaceutical companies is considered a more limited 
monopoly, typically spanning 14 years of its exclusive term,31 and 
possibly none of its term at all.32 
Pharmaceutical companies invest hundreds of millions—and in 
some cases even billions—of dollars into R&D for new drugs, 
while generic companies do not need to spend as much for their 
market entry because they can rely on the clinical trial results and 
satisfied approval requirements submitted by the patented 
pharmaceutical company.33  Without patent protection, it is 
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would make the costly 
investments necessary to provide this social benefit because they 
would never be able to recover these investments.34  It is for this 
reason that the patent system is typically acknowledged as a 
successful and necessary component of pharmaceutical 
development; despite the higher cost to consumers who purchase 
patented drugs, the drugs might not exist but for patent 
protection.35 
i. Patent Term Extensions Through Regulatory 
Exclusivities 
There are a number of opportunities afforded to pharmaceutical 
patents to supplement the term provided by the Patent Act.  These 
                                                                                                             
30 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348. 
31 See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market 
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 
(2007) (noting that the “maximum effective patent life” is fourteen years). 
32 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348 (“Much (or even all) of the term of these initial 
patents may have expired by the time the products are brought to market.”). 
33 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (listing the FDA generic drug application 
requirements). 
34 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits 
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1908 (2013) (“Conventional economic actors will only 
produce a good when they can appropriate sufficient returns to recoup the capitalized 
costs of providing the good.”); see also Roin, supra note 22, at 508 (highlighting the 
basic economic concept of corporate hesitation to invest in ideas without a chance of 
substantial returns). 
35 See Roin, supra note 22, at 508. 
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extensions have been referred to as regulatory exclusivities36 or 
“pseudo-patents.”37  The Orphan Drug Act of 198338 and the 
Hatch–Waxman Act of 198439 were the first of these exclusivities 
to have an impact on the patent system with respect to 
pharmaceuticals.  The Orphan Drug Act provides a financial 
incentive to pharmaceutical companies that create drugs to treat 
rare diseases and conditions40 by providing extended market 
exclusivity, among other financial aids like grants and tax 
exemptions.41  The Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984 increased the 
effective exclusivity period for new brand-name drugs and also 
provided drug innovators with market exclusivity for making 
changes to a previously approved drug product.42  Thus, this Act 
grants drug innovators the ability to temporarily prevent generic 
companies from relying on their updated R&D information to 
create a generic drug.43  The act also seeks to lower drug prices 
through competition, and still enables generic companies to file for 
FDA approval by relying on the brand-name drug’s approval 
application for a previously approved drug.44  Several years after 
the passage of these Acts, The Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) created an additional 
                                                                                                             
36 See John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992–2012, 23 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 525, 541 (2013). 
37 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 359. 
38 Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§ 
360aa–360ee). 
39 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012)). 
40 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (defining “rare” as “any disease or condition which (A) affects 
less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or (B) affects more than 200,000 in the 
United States and for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing 
and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be 
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug”). 
41 Id. § 360cc–ee.  Though not stated in the Act, drugs that treat rare diseases are 
“commonly referred to as orphan drugs because, prior to the Act, few drug companies 
were willing to ‘adopt’ products to treat these diseases.” M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20971, ORPHAN DRUG ACT: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS (2001). 
42 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman 
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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incentive in the form of an exclusivity term extension for drugs 
with applications to pediatric medicine.45 
b) An Overview of the FDA Regulatory Approval Process 
and Its Role in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
After receiving patent approval but before entering the market, 
a pharmaceutical product must receive FDA approval, which 
assures that the new product is both safe and effective enough to be 
made commercially available.46  While the patent process is 
viewed as the key to success for pharmaceutical innovators, the 
FDA approval process is traditionally perceived as both an 
economic and time-consuming setback.47  With a patent term 
already running, drug companies wish to expedite any further 
approval requirements as quickly and inexpensively as they can to 
gain maximum profitability with their limited market-exclusivity.48  
However, pharmaceutical companies can spend up to several 
billion dollars per new drug to gain entry into the market.49  About 
half of the money that companies spend on R&D is spent 
performing clinical trials in order to satisfy the FDA regulations 
governing market approval.50  Furthermore, the FDA approval 
process can take as long as ten to twelve years.51  Importantly, the 
cost to pharmaceutical companies does not stop after approval; the 
final phase of safety and quality assessments that occur during the 
                                                                                                             
45 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.§ 301). 
46 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
47 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 349; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional 
Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 20 HEALTH AFF. 119, 132 (2001). 
48 See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 70 (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (noting that a running patent causes drug firms to make every 
effort to accelerate progress because their reward is conditional on the success of the drug 
as well as the amount of time they are competitively valuable). 
49 See Herper, supra note 3. 
50 See DiMasi et al., supra note 1 (estimating clinical-period costs of $467 million per 
drug). 
51 See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20, at 966. 
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post-marketing period can cost pharmaceutical companies between 
twenty and thirty million dollars.52 
The requirements that must be met for approval of a newly 
patented drug are extensive, and the FDA has the authority to deny 
market approval to any drug that does not meet its standards.53  
Most importantly, these requirements include investigatory reports 
of clinical trials, which demonstrate the drug’s safety and 
efficacy.54  They also require chemical-ingredient lists 
accompanied by a statement of the drug’s composition; a detailed 
report containing how and where the drug was manufactured, 
processed and packaged; samples of the drug or its components at 
the request of the Secretary; samples of the proposed drug label; 
and any supplemental documentation as deemed necessary by the 
Secretary or with respect to the drug’s pending approval.55  The 
application for FDA approval typically also requires the inclusion 
of the respective patent for which drug the applicant seeks 
approval.56  Though FDA approval is still required for generic 
drugs, the standards that generic drug companies must meet are far 
less exacting than those governing new drugs.57 
In total, the FDA approval process requires successfully 
completing twelve steps from the preclinical through post-
marketing periods.58  These steps include animal testing and an 
outline for proposed human testing in the preclinical period, three 
phases of human testing and studies in the clinical period, meeting 
time, application submission, application review, research review, 
labeling review, and facility review in the New Drug Application 
                                                                                                             
52 See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing 
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 370 
(2006). 




57 Compare id. (approval requirements for newly developed products), with § 355(j) 
(approval requirements for generic products). 
58 The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last visited May 
22, 2014). 
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review period, and then a final decision from the FDA.59  
Furthermore, there is also a fourth phase of safety monitoring and 
risk assessment that occurs during the post-marketing period, 
because it is presumably impossible to determine all of the effects 
of any given drug in the clinical trial phases alone.60 
B. Current Industry Trends: Compounding Pharmacies and 
Nationwide Drug Shortage 
 In order to understand why it has become so necessary to 
review the protections surrounding the pharmaceutical industry 
and move towards reform, it is important to be made aware of the 
current state of the entire pharmaceutical industry as well as certain 
relevant trends.  Both the recent unprecedented federal regulation 
of compounding pharmacies, as well as the ongoing nationwide 
drug shortage, play a role in ensuring that pharmaceutical 
innovation is at its highest and that the incentives provided to 
innovators are both reliable and effective. 
1. The Non-Federally Regulated Pharmaceutical Market: 
Compounded Drugs 
In addition to the federally regulated pharmaceutical industry, 
there is also another large but traditionally unregulated sector of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States—compounding 
pharmacies.  According to a Forbes article from September 2013, a 
“2012 article in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery says the number 
of drugs invented per billion dollars of R&D invested has been cut 
in half every nine years for half a century.”61  Furthermore, with 
the costs of R&D steadily increasing and the rate of success 
steadily declining, small companies stand almost no chance of 
competing in the industry, becoming swallowed by the 
pharmaceutical giants who have greater resources to invest in a 
drug that might potentially succeed.62  This leaves a smaller 
company with two basic options: (1) become an exclusively 
                                                                                                             
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See Herper, supra note 3. 
62 See id. 
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generic drug company; or (2) adopt drugs that were abandoned by 
large companies, forfeiting the opportunity to patent its own drugs 
and potentially costing enormous amounts of money to purchase a 
patent license.63  However, soon there may be another option 
available to such companies, as the traditionally unregulated 
compounding pharmacies have recently become targeted by 
regulators. 
Compounding drug pharmacies began in the 1800s, and used to 
be the only source of prescription medication.64  Traditionally, 
compounding pharmacies filled special orders placed by doctors 
for individual patients.65  The purpose of compounding pharmacies 
was to address these individual patient needs on a small scale by 
customizing prescription medications in small batches on a case-
by-case basis.  Today, there are currently over 50,000 
compounding pharmacies in the United States.66 
Until very recently, state pharmacy boards—and not the 
FDA—oversaw compounding pharmacies.  This is unlike the 
commercial drug manufacturing process discussed above, whose 
products are subject to intensive oversight.67  In 1997, the FDA 
crafted the first piece of legislation to address compounding 
pharmacies, the FDAMA.68  Under the FDAMA, true 
compounding pharmacies were exempt from various FDA 
regulations: the Act exempted compounded drugs from FDA 
approval and registry and compounding pharmacies from 
compliance with any “Good Manufacturing Practices” or safety 
                                                                                                             
63 See id. 
64 See DAVID L. COWEN & WILLIAM H. HELFAND, PHARMACY: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY 100–01 (1990). 
65 See Ohio: Ohio Weighs Changes in Execution Methods with Focus on Obtaining 
New Sources of Lethal Drugs, U.S. OFFICIAL NEWS, at 2 (Feb. 16, 2013). 
66 See Kara Net Hinkley, Compounding Pharmacies: Compounding Interest, 06.2013 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. MAG. 22, 23 (2013). 
67 See STAFF OF DEL. EDWARD J. MARKEY, STATE OF DISARRAY: HOW STATES’ 
INABILITY TO OVERSEE COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES PUTS PUBLIC HEALTH AT RISK 6 
(2013) [hereinafter STATE OF DISARRAY] (a report written by the staff of then 
Congressman, now Senator Edward J. Markey (D–MA) using the responses to an 
investigation which examined the state oversight of compounding pharmacies). 
68 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 
127, 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997). 
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and efficacy standards.69  The theory behind these seemingly 
permissive regulations is that “public health concerns are minor 
when mass production is not involved,” and it is not until mass 
manufacturing occurs that safety and effectiveness become a 
greater risk.70  Compounding pharmacies have the ability to 
perform quality control with ease because of the small quantities 
produced at a time, so deferring to state authorities for regulation 
was deemed reasonable.71 
Regulations governing these pharmacies remained untouched 
until October 2012, when a contaminated steroid produced by the 
New England Compounding Center (NECC) in Massachusetts 
killed or injured hundreds.72  The NECC was allegedly one of the 
many compounding pharmacies that operated more like a large 
drug manufacturer than a small-scale compounding pharmacy.73  
The FDA took direct action to find the root of the safety issues 
plaguing the NECC by inspecting several compounding 
pharmacies, and the results of their inquiry proved disturbing.74 
                                                                                                             
69 See Jessica Dye, U.S. Senate Committee Advances Drug Compounding Bill, 
REUTERS (May 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-fda-drugs-
legislation-idUSBRE94L1AU20130522; see also STATE OF DISARRAY, supra note 67, at 
6. 
70 See Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confusion: 
Federal Regulation of Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit Split, 36 
AM. J.L. & MED. 220, 232–34 (2010). 
71 See id. 
72 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MULTI-STATE OUTBREAK OF 
FUNGAL MENINGITIS AND OTHER INFECTIONS—CASE COUNT (2013), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis-map-large.html#casecount_table.  For more 
information on the meningitis outbreak and the continually developing outcomes, see 
Scott Gottlieb, Compounding a Crisis at FDA, FORBES, May 24, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2013/05/24/compounding-a-crisis-at-fda. 
73 See STAFF OF DEL. EDWARD J. MARKEY, COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES 
COMPOUNDING RISK 10 (2012) [hereinafter COMPOUNDING RISK] (a report written by the 
staff of then Congressman, now Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA)). 
74 See U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY: 2013 FDA PHARMACY INSPECTION 
ASSIGNMENT 10 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm347722.htm.  Faulty pharmacy 
conditions included “unidentified black particles floating in vials of supposedly sterile 
medicine; rust and mold in ‘clean rooms’ where sterile injectable medications were 
produced; technicians handling supposedly sterile products with bare hands; and 
employees wearing non-sterile lab coats.” Margaret A. Hamburg, Proactive Inspections 
Further Highlight Need for New Authorities for Pharmacy Compounding, FDA VOICE 
 
1074 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:1059 
After attempts to initiate regulatory changes to the 
compounding pharmacy market, a final piece of proposed 
legislation was signed into law in November of 2013.75  This 
regulatory law, entitled the “Drug Quality and Security Act,”76 
clarifies current federal law about pharmacy compounding in an 
effort to create a uniform, nationwide standard applicable to 
compounding pharmacies.77  The Act separates regulation over 
traditional small-scale compounding pharmacies from large-scale 
compounders that operate more like pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
and creates a category for these types of pharmacies called 
“outsourcing facilities.”78  It also provides voluntary federal 
registration for outsourcing facilities, set to begin in 2015.79  These 
facilities will be permitted to compound bulk quantities of drugs on 
the FDA’s drug shortage list, in addition to other drugs that are on 
a “‘clinical need’ list to be established by the FDA, without a 
prescription, as well as distribute these formulations out of state 
without limitation.”80  Registered outsourcing facilities will be 
subject to FDA oversight similar to the oversight to which regular 
commercial pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States are 
subjected.81  The FDA will also have the authority to conduct risk-
based inspections.82  Further, certain drugs will be listed as 
prohibited from being compounded at these facilities.83 
                                                                                                             
(Apr. 11, 2013), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/04/proactive-inspections-
further-highlight-need-for-new-authorities-for-pharmacy-compounding (Dr. Margaret A. 
Hamburg is the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration).  In her post, Dr. 
Hamburg linked to SUMMARY: 2013 FDA PHARMACY INSPECTION ASSIGNMENT, supra 
note 74, to reference the inspections conducted. 
75 See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Bill on Drug Compounding Clears Congress a Year 
After a Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A15. 
76 Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013). 
77 Id. § 503B. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. § 744K. 
80 See Press Release, Imprimis Pharmaceuticals, Imprimis Optimistic After 
Congressional Passage of the Drug Quality and Security Act (Nov. 19, 2013), available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20131119-905263.html?dsk=y. 
81 Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013). 
82 Id. § 503B(b)(4). 
83 Id. § 503B(a)(5)–(6). 
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2. Nationwide Drug Shortage 
An ongoing nationwide drug shortage also bears upon the 
reform of the pharmaceutical industry as it currently exists.  The 
nationwide drug shortage in the United States has persisted for 
several years; hundreds of drugs appear on a federal notice 
shortage list including cancer drugs, anesthetics for surgery, drugs 
for emergency medicine, and electrolytes for intravenous 
feeding.84  Manufacturing problems, production disruption, 
approval oversight, need for recall, increased demand, and a shift 
towards compounding pharmacies are all included in the ongoing 
list of reasons for the unprecedented shortage.85  More often than 
not, manufacturing problems occur as a result of quality-control 
problems with the product or the facility in which the product is 
created—areas the FDA regulatory approval process is designed to 
monitor before market entry occurs.86  Drug shortages are a unique 
feature of the pharmaceutical industry because the supply and 
demand of necessary drugs operates differently than supply and 
demand in other markets given that prices cannot fix the need for 
essential medications.87  Also, the shelf life of drugs is an 
                                                                                                             
84 See Katie Thomas, Drug Shortages Persist in U.S., Harming Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2012, at A1; Current Drug Shortages Index, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/ucm050792.htm (last visited June 6, 2014). 
85 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING 
DRUG SHORTAGES 11 (2013) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES], 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM 
372566.pdf (explaining that “[o]nce a manufacturer experiences a discontinuance or 
interruption in manufacturing, a shortage will occur if there is no other manufacturer to 
step in to fill the gap in supply, or if other manufacturers cannot increase production 
quickly enough to make up the loss” (citing J. Woodcock and M. Wosinska, Economic 
and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile Injectable Drug Shortages, 93:2 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 174–75 (2013))); see also KEVIN HANINGER, 
AMBER JESSUP & KATHLEEN KOEHLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND 
EVALUATION, OFF. OF SCI. & DATA POL’Y, ISSUE BRIEF: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
CAUSES OF DRUG SHORTAGES 1 (2011) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS], available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2011/DrugShortages/ib.shtml. 
86 See STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85, at 1 (including issues 
“such as roof leakage; mold in manufacturing areas; or unsterilized vials or containers to 
hold the product”).  Quality issues are those that pose a serious risk to the health and 
safety of patients, and often include problems related to contamination or sterility of the 
product and facility. Id. 
87 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 1. 
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important consideration because of how dangerous the 
consumption of expired pharmaceutical products may be.88 
Drug shortages directly affect consumers because of the 
necessity for access to a particular drug.89  In fact, in direct 
response to the pleas from desperate patients in 2011, President 
Obama was effectively forced into issuing an executive order 
providing that drug makers must notify the FDA when a shortage 
appeared imminent.90  Most importantly, however, the drug 
shortage has also caused the FDA to loosen its grip on drug 
importation procedures as well as on drug approvals for 
manufacturers.91  In fact, part of the FDA’s strategic plan to 
address these drug shortages is to expedite the review of drug 
products that are facing a shortage, and to use its discretion in 
enforcing approval of drugs that are considered medically 
necessary.92  The impact of a drug shortage on drug companies is 
that hasty drug approval, for example, may force a company that is 
in the process of developing a new drug product to regress and 
redirect its focus on a product that has already entered the market.  
The reasons for drug shortages and the additional post-market 
approval and review subsequently required may cut into effective 
patent terms and add to the costs of R&D.  Accordingly, the 
frequency of drug shortages may provide insight into a revisiting 
of patent protection, specifically with respect to the term. 
                                                                                                             
88 See STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85, at 4. 
89 See Thomas, supra note 84, at A1. 
90 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, We Can’t Wait: Obama 
Administration Takes Action to Reduce Prescription Drug Shortages, Fight Price 
Gouging: President Issues Executive Order, Backs Legislation to Require Drug 
Companies to Report Shortages (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/10/31/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-takes-action-reduce-prescription-
drug. 
91 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RES., MANUAL OF 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, MAPP 6003.1: DRUG SHORTAGE MANAGEMENT 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/Manual
ofPoliciesProcedures/ucm079936.pdf. 
92 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING 
DRUG SHORTAGES 13–14 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM372566.pdf. 
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II.  THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM AND 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The patent system operates effectively with respect to 
industries that would suffer from unfair market disadvantages if 
they were barred from developing a superior version of a product 
that is not original enough to warrant overarching monopolistic 
protection.  However, the patent system is often viewed as a poor 
fit as it is applied to the pharmaceutical industry.93  Although 
inventions in other markets may still be created even if they cannot 
receive patent protection, the same does not hold true in the case of 
pharmaceuticals.  There are few other industries, if any, in which 
participants must spend as much money to gain market entry, and 
the pharmaceutical industry is burdened by this cost not only 
because of the complexities involved in making a drug, but also 
because of the regulatory barrier created by the FDA in order to 
ensure that drugs on the market are safe and effective. 
A. The Difficulty with Applying the Patent Requirements to the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
All three patent requirements engender conflict when they are 
applied to the pharmaceutical industry.  The useful, novel, and 
non-obvious94 requirements are seen as a shortcoming in Patent 
law with respect to advancing the interests of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  The utility requirement serves as an inappropriate 
standard for pharmaceuticals because of how early in the R&D 
process drug patents are filed.  Further, the novel and non-obvious 
requirements of Patent law “operate to prevent valuable drugs from 
being patented before they have been developed for public use.”95  
The patent system offers no reward for investing in clinical trials if 
one of these standards is not met.96 
                                                                                                             
93 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 364–65. 
94 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012). 
95 Roin, supra note 22, at 516 (noting that these requirements fail to ultimately 
consider that the significance of a patent stems directly from the social value that the 
public receives from a product, not simply from knowledge of the information underlying 
that product). 
96 See id. 
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1. The Utility Requirement 
The utility requirement of Patent law conflicts with the nature 
of pharmaceutical law.  The Supreme Court specifically articulated 
that the useful requirement of patent law is not a “hunting license,” 
meaning that patent law exists to reward the conclusions rather 
than the search.97  This requirement is sufficient for most products, 
whose creators can easily establish the utility they provide upon 
application.  In the context of pharmaceuticals, the reasonableness 
of this requirement is clear: Patent law seeks to protect valuable 
inventions, and a drug only has value so long as it is useful.98  
However, the nature of the pharmaceutical industry effectively 
requires the utility standard to be lowered because the actual 
usefulness of a drug cannot possibly be proved at the onset of 
patent application.99  Instead, a drug company must invest 
significant amounts of time and money into R&D, as explained 
above, in order to meet the FDA clinical requirements that will 
eventually determine whether or not the drug is actually useful to 
the extent that it was set out to be in its patent.100  Courts have 
recognized the cyclical nature of this problem; indeed, a drug 
company needs guaranteed intellectual property protection over the 
information disclosed in its patent and will not invest time or 
money into pharmaceutical innovation without that protection.101  
As a result, the USPTO has adjusted the current standard for utility 
for pharmaceutical patents to any “reasonable correlation” between 
a drug’s pharmacological activities, or how the drug works, and 
how or why that product will work in humans as it is asserted in 
the patent application.102  The USPTO even instructs patent 
examiners that proof of clinical testing in humans for patent 
approval is an “unnecessary burden” for pharmaceutical patents.103  
This is certainly a departure from the utility standard that almost 
                                                                                                             
97 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
98 See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 720. 
99 See id. (“Patent protection on drugs typically begins and ends too early to permit 
firms to capture the full value of subsequently developed information about drug 
effects.”). 
100 See Herper, supra note 3. 
101 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
102 MPEP § 2107.03 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). 
103 Id. 
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all other kinds of patent applications require, as well as a departure 
from the high bar that the Brenner Court established for proof of 
utility for a patent.104  It also serves as an acknowledgement that 
the utility standard is not appropriate on its face with respect to 
pharmaceuticals.105 
2. The Novelty Requirement 
Oversight of the pharmaceutical industry is also part and parcel 
of the novelty requirement.  Once a claimed invention has been 
made available to the public before its effective filing date, it is 
generally considered no longer novel, and therefore not patent 
eligible.106  An exception exists for inventors or joint inventors 
who have disclosed their invention or idea within one year of the 
effective filing date.107  Such publications are not considered prior 
art,108 thus encouraging the early application of patentable 
creations.  The patent system is designed to reward inventions that 
the public could not receive if not for the incentives gained from 
protection.  Of course, there is no reason to protect information 
once it is publicly available in order to obtain its value because it is 
freely accessible.109  It is for this reason that the novelty 
requirement is perceived as a sensible and central bar to patent 
approval, no matter the invention seeking protection.110  However, 
                                                                                                             
104 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). 
105 See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 724. 
106 The novelty doctrine bars the patent approval for any innovation that was patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or “the claimed invention 
was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent 
published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, 
as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. § 102(b).  The specific language of this statute includes exceptions for “(1) 
disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; 
and (2) disclosures appearing in applications and patents.” Id. 
109 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) 
(explaining the purpose of rewarding inventors who “give something of value to the 
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge”). 
110 See Roin, supra note 22, at 519 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1966) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)) (noting the Supreme Court’s reverence of 
the novelty requirement as the key to promoting the constitutional purpose for patents). 
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this broad application of the novelty doctrine overlooks the needed 
incentive for protecting the actual pharmaceutical development of 
patented invention, a concept that plays a crucial role in this 
industry.111 
The nature of the pharmaceutical industry—and, in particular, 
the FDA approval requirement—conflicts with the novelty 
requirement in a unique way.  Patents are awarded in return for the 
disclosure of an invention but without any regard for the 
development of that idea.112  This concept threatens the 
pharmaceutical industry in several ways.  A considerably small 
percentage of proposed drugs ever even make it through all of the 
required phases of FDA approval,113 so the public never actually 
gains access to the patented drug but, rather, to the drug 
information.  Furthermore, it is common for scientific journals and 
academic publications to disclose drugs in such a way that those 
publications therefore stand as a bar to patentability.114  Often, 
courts make matters worse by “invaliding drug patents on the basis 
of seemingly trivial disclosures often made before anyone 
recognized the value of the drug or knew enough about it to file a 
patent.”115  However, because the information has been disclosed, 
it is no longer considered novel and therefore can no longer be 
patented for use in a drug that passes FDA approval in the 
future.116  Accordingly, this requirement creates a paradox with 
respect to patent protection for pharmaceuticals “wherein a new 
                                                                                                             
111 See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 924–26 
(2011).  Note that while this argument utilizes pre-AIA patent law, the analysis regarding 
novelty remains the same for the post-AIA patent law with respect to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
112 See id. at 924–25. 
113 For example, a study conducted from 2004 through 2010 found only 7% of 
traditional small molecule chemical drugs that entered human clinical trials obtained 
FDA marketing approval. See Bill Berkrot, Success Rates for Experimental Drugs Falls: 
Study, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/health-us-
pharmaceuticals-success-idUKTRE71D2U920110214. 
114 See Roin, supra note 22, at 517. 
115 Id. 
116 See Seymore, supra note 111, at 948–49. 
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drug can become unpatentable before it has been tested in clinical 
trials.”117 
This problem arises frequently because it is quite common for 
information in the pharmaceutical industry to be disclosed, either 
intentionally or accidentally.118  The patent system, with respect to 
such disclosure, places researchers who are simultaneously 
working in the same area in a difficult position insofar as the 
novelty requirement serves as a barrier to pharmaceutical 
patents.119  Patent applications for pharmaceuticals typically 
include a broad range of all of the drugs in consideration for 
compounding because the application process occurs so early in 
R&D.120  It is difficult to know at that time which drugs will 
actually be compounded to create the final developed drug product, 
so the application becomes a type of catchall to ensure protection 
for the patent owner.121  However, some of the disclosed drugs are 
eventually discarded, mistakenly or otherwise, and as a result are 
not able to be patented for use in subsequent drug development 
even if they could prove valuable in the future.122  Thus, innovators 
may be forced to give up their patent and consequently forfeit their 
                                                                                                             
117 Roin, supra note 22, at 520.  “In the pharmaceutical industry, this rule means that a 
drug cannot be patented if the idea for it was previously disclosed to the public; no 
exception is made for when the disclosed drug has not yet been tested in clinical trials 
and thus has not been approved by the FDA.” Id. at 517.  “As a result, the novelty 
requirement makes it easy for valuable drugs to become unpatentable before they have 
been developed for public use.” Id.  While not the main issue of the case, an illustration 
of this problem occurred in the facts underlying a case in 2007 when the Federal Circuit 
heard an issue relating to a drug that was invented based on the idea of combining two 
older drugs to create an even more beneficial effect. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. 
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  Although the 
company was unaware that the other drug information was previously publicly disclosed, 
its patent on the combination drug became unenforceable once the previous publication 
was realized, despite the fact that the tangible value received by the combination was 
unknown to the public before the idea was patented and FDA approved. 
118 See Roin, supra note 22, at 522. 
119 See Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: 
How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent 
System with Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 556, 
557 (2006). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1542–
43 (2005). 
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research for what could have developed into a vital and valuable 
drug product.123  Those abandoned applications that inventors are 
forced to give up can then be considered as prior art for future 
applications.124  Moreover, it is also possible that lost within this 
broad range of information is the disclosure of a new drug that a 
researcher does not even realize he has disclosed.125  Further, the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation dictates that a drug is not 
considered novel if it has been unknowingly disclosed, even if the 
researchers do not realize their own discovery.126  Accordingly, 
this doctrine interacts with the novelty requirement in a way that 
precludes patent approval for drugs that may have provided the 
public with a large social benefit but whose value can never be 
realized because certain information was disclosed in an 
unrecognizable way.  While support for this doctrine may be 
reasonable for certain inventions,127 it overlooks and suppresses 
innovation for others, namely pharmaceuticals.  For other products 
whose development does not require the same level of complexity 
as pharmaceuticals do, knowledge of those inventions may 
reasonably preclude patentability because the public can already 
benefit from disclosure of that knowledge.128  However, without 
the subsequent R&D of drugs, the costs of which drug companies 
rely on patent protection to cover, the public will never benefit 
from a pharmaceutical simply because its underlying information 
was disclosed,129 because the drug will never make its way to 
                                                                                                             
123 See Roin, supra note 22, at 528; see also Moore, supra note 122, at 1542–43. 
124 See MPEP § 901.02 (9th ed. 2014). 
125 See Maria Souleau, Legal Aspects of Product Protection—What a Medicinal 
Chemist Should Know About Patent Protection, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL 
CHEMISTRY 707, 721 (Camille Georges Wermuth ed., 2d ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780127444819. 
126 See Roin, supra note 22, at 526 (“Consequently, whenever a drug is unknowingly 
disclosed to the public, it can cease to be novel before anyone knows about it, and the 
patent system will no longer reward any efforts to discover it or establish its therapeutic 
value.”). 
127 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 
383–84 (2005). 
128 See id. 
129 See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 1, 55, 65–69 (1992) (discussing the disclosure theory and noting how sometimes, the 
disclosure of technical information alone may benefit the public). 
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gaining FDA approval and entry into the market.  The complexity 
inherent in to the actual invention of a pharmaceutical product 
demonstrates that a drug only has value so long as it is developed 
and tested by creators who understand those complexities.  
Because of the necessity for FDA approval in order to enter the 
market, the value of a drug is heavily dependent on product 
development and production of information about whether a drug 
is safe and effective, and not simply the information alone.130 
Lastly, the ability to obtain patents in the pharmaceutical 
industry is often undercut by the novelty requirement because of 
the nature of the development and research that is required in order 
to invent a beneficial drug.  University and private-sector 
researchers are often pressured to publish their findings for new 
drug discoveries given the nature of their work.131  However, the 
weight given to academic publishing makes it difficult to keep 
certain elements of research confidential as information may be 
published before its value is realized,132 and it is not always clear 
which portions of the research must remain secretive in order to 
ensure patentability.133  This problem is clearly evidenced by the 
large number of universities that were unable to patent their “life-
science” discoveries because of published research.134  Moreover, 
the idea that the novelty requirement conflicts in its application to 
                                                                                                             
130 See JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 39–68 (2004) (examining the extensive clinical trial procedures that 
are necessary in order to adequately identify drugs that hold significant value). 
131 See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: 
Law, Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 
AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 208 (2002) (discussing the pressure academic researchers encounter 
to publish their findings early, because of its influence on hiring and job security as well 
as preference for research grants, and academic awards). 
132 See Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., 195 F. App’x 
947, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that a patent on certain antibodies was anticipated by 
the inventors’ own abstract, in which they had inadvertently disclosed the patented 
antibodies, even though the “significance of the claimed antibody was not known until 
after the abstract was submitted”). 
133 See Roin, supra note 22, at 527. 
134 See Eric G. Campbell & Eran Bendavid, Data-Sharing and Data-Withholding in 
Genetics and the Life Sciences: Results of a National Survey of Technology Transfer 
Officers, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 241, 252 (2003) (finding that 82% of universities 
with large medical-research programs were unable to patent at least one of these 
inventions because of research publications). 
1084 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:1059 
the pharmaceutical industry is well supported by the numerous 
drugs that have been denied patents for lack of novelty.135 
3. Non-Obvious Requirement 
The final requirement for patent approval, the non-obviousness 
standard, also clashes with pharmaceutical innovation.  Described 
as the “the most important of the basic patent requirements,”136 this 
requirement helps uphold the true purpose of patent law in 
“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”137  The non-
obviousness requirement ensures that only the results of true 
innovation discovered through risks and effort are rewarded, and 
not the “results of ordinary innovation[.]”138  The non-obviousness 
requirement precludes patent approval for subject matter that is 
obvious, before the effective filing date of the invention, to a 
person who has an “ordinary skill in the art” which the invention 
pertains to.139  In the context of pharmaceuticals, patents are not 
awarded to drug discoveries that are the results of “routine 
procedures” that produce expected results,140 where a skilled drug 
researcher or chemist would have to do no more than simply verify 
                                                                                                             
135 See, e.g., Ex parte Ames, No. 2007-1138, 2007 WL 1033514, at *3–4 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 
28, 2007); Ex parte Sander-Struckmeier, No. 2005-1150, 2005 WL 4773290, at *3–5 
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 25, 2005); Ex parte Williams, No. 2005-0902, 2005 WL 4773220, at *4 
(B.P.A.I. June 22, 2005); Ex parte Bhagwat, No. 2003-1424, 2004 WL 366282, at *4 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 6, 2004); Ex parte Bennett, No. 2003-1678, 2004 WL 318775, *4–5 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Gilbert v. Levin, No. 2004-1391, 2004 WL 1697793, at *2 
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Feldmann, No. 2002-0253, 2003 WL 25281968, at *2–4 
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 2003); Ex parte D’Antonio, No. 1998-1987, 2001 WL 35825743, at 
*6–10 (B.P.A.I. July 24, 2001); Ex parte Hofmann, No. 1996-0729, 1999 WL 33548892, 
at *4–5 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 14, 1999) (rejecting the claims on a compound proposed as a 
treatment for HIV, but allowing the method-of-use claims to issue); Ex parte Saito, No. 
94-4009, 1999 WL 33230062, at *5–6 (B.P.A.I. June 9, 1999); Ex parte Murrer, No. 95-
2603, 1995 WL 1696811, at *5 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995); Ex parte Picard, No. 95-2879, 
1995 WL 1696846, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995). 
136 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 611 (4d ed. 2007). 
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
138 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). 
139 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); see also In re Dow Chemical Co. 837 F.2d 469, 473 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that patents are not awarded where “the prior art would have 
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process should be carried out and 
would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in light of the prior art”). 
140 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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the successful results of those reasonable expectations.141  
However, like the novel requirement, this standard for patent 
approval overlooks the unique nature of pharmaceutical 
development. 
The practical application of this standard is what makes it 
inappropriate for pharmaceutical inventions.  Alarmingly, in 
application, the non-obviousness standard denies patent protection 
to an idea or concept for a new drug that is expected to produce 
successful results—drugs that are expected to benefit the public 
are facially denied patent protection.142  Therefore, the general 
rule is that “the more likely it appears that a new drug will be 
successful, the less likely it is to be patentable under the non-
obviousness requirement.”143  The outcome of this rule as an effect 
of the non-obviousness standard creates a paradoxical result for the 
pharmaceutical industry, because drugs that seem to hold 
significant value early in their development may almost certainly 
be denied patent protection.144 
Furthermore, the non-obviousness standard denies patent 
protection for a potentially obvious idea without considering the 
substantial investment necessary to give that idea value.  The 
public gains no benefit from an idea or concept, no matter how 
obvious, until an investment is made into that idea’s 
development.145  A major criticism of the non-obviousness 
requirement is that it does not take the cost of development into 
account146 and, therefore, fails to consider the possibility that 
                                                                                                             
141 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
142 See id. at 1371 (“[A]ny superior property must be unexpected to be considered as 
evidence of non-obviousness.” (citing In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).  
For example, when a pain reliever was characterized as having a “substantially greater 
analgesic effectiveness than one of the most, if not the most, active analgesic compound 
of the art,” its patent application was rejected because these superior drug properties were 
deemed predictable based on its chemical structure. In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013, 
1017–18 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
143 See Roin, supra note 22, at 537 (citing Ex parte Childers, No. 2003-0890, 2003 WL 
25277879, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2003)). 
144 See id. 
145 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING 
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 10 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002). 
146 Compare Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1678 (2003) (“If patents are to drive innovation in biotechnology, rather than 
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although an idea may be obvious, its development into an 
invention that reaches the public may never occur “without a 
patent to motivate its development.”147  Incorrectly, this standard 
assumes that, once the concept for any invention is “accessible to 
the public through its obviousness, the invention itself will also be 
available.”148  While a non-obvious standard forms a reasonable 
barrier to patentability for inventions in other industries that can be 
easily developed once underlying information is disclosed or easily 
obtained, the cost of R&D provides a disincentive to drug 
companies to invest in a new product absent patent protection.149  
“The non[-]obviousness standard is therefore based on the dubious 
assumption that obvious inventions do not have significant 
development costs, or that firms will always be willing to incur 
those costs without having patents on the inventions.”150 
Perhaps the most alarming conflict of the non-obviousness 
standard with the pharmaceutical industry is that it creates a 
paradoxical result for the medical community because scientific 
advances in pharmaceutical technology serve to exacerbate the 
issue of non-obviousness.151  As researchers and scientists work to 
make the process of drug discovery and development more 
predictable, and subsequently more efficient, the non-obviousness 
standard becomes more of a barrier, by denying patent protection 
for products that rely on that predictability.152 
                                                                                                             
merely invention . . . courts must take account of the cost and uncertainty of post-
invention testing and development.”), with MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 136, at 34 
(arguing against awarding patents on the basis of commercialized and developmental 
costs). 
147 Roin, supra note 22, at 535. 
148 Id. at 522 (citing Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 69 (1992)). 
149 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 350. 
150 Roin, supra note 22, at 533. 
151 See id. at 542 (“[T]he non[-]obviousness requirement, almost by definition, turns 
progress in the pharmaceutical sciences against itself; that is, it denies patent protection to 
new drugs based on the very advances in science that led to their discovery.”); id.  
(“Through their successes, medicinal chemists are beginning to get better at predicting 
the pharmacological properties of compounds based on their structure.”).  
152 See id. 
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B. Conflict with the Patent Term 
An additional conflict that exists between the patent system 
and the pharmaceutical industry is the timeline of the patent term.  
Pharmaceutical innovators rely on the market exclusivity granted 
through patent protection to make returns on their investments in 
their products.153  This market exclusivity serves as an incentive to 
invest and take risks, as well as security for profitability.154  Unlike 
most other products, however, pharmaceuticals require extensive 
FDA testing and approval before their product ever gains entry into 
the market.155  In recent years, the FDA has implemented even 
more requirements and has created higher standards that must be 
met.156  As discussed above, these clinical trial periods can last as 
long as ten to twelve years, and therefore cut into the twenty-year 
exclusivity term in a significant and detrimental way.157  Indeed, 
regardless of the amount of time the clinical trials take, the FDA 
approval process guarantees the impossibility for a pharmaceutical 
company to enjoy the market exclusivity benefits of its full patent 
term.158  The largest conflict here, from the position of 
pharmaceutical innovators, is that patents should be meaningful for 
as long as they are set to be, and “what Congress grants should not 
be taken away by regulatory agencies.”159  Furthermore, the 
unpredictability of the patent system with respect to its application 
                                                                                                             
153 See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 650 (2011). 
154 See id. (classifying the process of developing, testing, and marketing a drug as a 
“notoriously expensive and high risk gamble”); see also Roin, supra note 22, at 503. 
155 See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 31, at 493. 
156 See Bill Berkrot, Success Rates for Experimental Drugs Falls: Study, REUTERS (Feb. 
14, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/health-us-pharmaceuticals-success-
idUKTRE71D2U920110214. 
157 See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20, and 
accompanying text. 
158 See Desrosiers, supra note 7, at 120–21 (1989) (“Since many FDA pre-market 
testing requirements are yet to be performed after the point most patents are obtained, a 
manufacturer is unable to market the drug for the full . . . patent term.”). 
159 Id. at 124 (citing Patent Term Extension and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 
97th Cong. 18 (1982)) [hereinafter Patent Hearings] (statement of Robert S. Walker, 
U.S. Rep., Pa.) (citing The Half-Life Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1981, http://www.ny
times.com/1981/05/23/opinion/the-half-life-patents.html). 
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to pharmaceuticals has also had a deteriorating impact on the 
effective market exclusivity term that innovators actually enjoy for 
their patented products.160 
III. A PROPOSED SHIFT TOWARDS REWARDS-BASED INCENTIVES OR 
REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITIES INSTEAD OF PATENT-BASED 
PROTECTION FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
In return for the benefits afforded to pharmaceutical companies 
under patent protection, the companies provide health benefits to 
the public.  This relationship serves as a particularly strong 
incentive for the provision of adequate protection to 
pharmaceutical innovators.  Until recently, the patent system was 
not perceived as a barrier to innovation.161  Recently, however, 
industry critiques of the patent system as it currently exists have 
explained how the system is a problem for many companies, in that 
it is no longer feasible to predict how long a company’s patent 
exclusivity term will actually last.162  Without such predictability, 
the patent system becomes useless for pharmaceutical innovators 
and investors. 
Despite their need to work in tandem, the patent system and the 
FDA regulatory approval process have been known to lack the 
cooperation necessary to operate effectively with respect to the 
pharmaceutical industry; “[p]atent protection is based on an 
                                                                                                             
160 See Holman, supra note 152, at 648 (citing Robert Armitage, A Fresh Start on 
Limiting Patent Eligibility: Barring Patents Where Information or the Exercise of Human 
Intellect is an Element of a Purported Invention, U. Ill. C. L. (Sept. 22, 2010), 
www.law.uiuc.edu/facultyadmin/chakrabarty/videos/armitage.html). Law suits from 
either generic drug companies or other innovators challenging patent validity, 
inconsistent judicial application of patent law and standards, post-market entry clinical 
testing, and product recall are just a few of the many setbacks in pharmaceutical industry 
that make the effective patent term unpredictable. Id. at 648–51. 
161 Compare WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (“The strongest case for patents in 
something like their present form is said to be found in a subset of the drug industry.”), 
with Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 34, at 1951 (“[Proposed incentive] approaches fill in 
a gap left by patents’ failure to incent valuable but highly nonexcludable innovations, and 
they counter the tendency of patents to exacerbate the problem by drawing resources 
away from such innovations.”). 
162 See Holman, supra note 153, at 648–51. 
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exclusively scientific inquiry that ignores the related issue of FDA 
approval necessary for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to fully use 
its patent.”163  Additionally, for the pharmaceutical industry, the 
current patent system does not achieve its intended goal in 
advancing innovation.  Rather, the current patent system inhibits 
innovation due to its overbroad requirements and a far too limited 
term period that do not cooperate with FDA approval, deeming 
patent protection meaningless.  “The current unpredictable 
environment, wherein the investment backed expectations of 
investors are given short shrift, disincentivizes investment and 
thereby hampers innovation.”164 
For the patent system to work, it must actually enhance 
innovation, a goal that is not being met with respect to 
pharmaceuticals.165  Economists and scholars have approached the 
difficulties presented by the current U.S. patent system in several 
different ways, debating whether there are better schemes than 
patent protection to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation.166  The 
exploration of alternative strategies has increased in recent years, 
but no substantial reform has been made with respect to the 
pharmaceutical industry and the patent system.167  Alternative 
approaches need to be implemented in order to ensure the 
continuance of innovative, effective, and beneficial health products 
in a federally regulated and safe pharmaceutical market.  These 
approaches include a proposed rewards-based incentive program 
for pharmaceutical innovators and shifting the limited monopoly 
                                                                                                             
163 Sarah Renée Craig, Placebo Patents: Creating Stronger Intellectual Property 
Protection for Pharmaceuticals Approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, 19 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 147 (2011) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 
F. Supp. 2d 348, 348–50 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 435 F. App’x 917 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
164 Holman, supra note 153, at 650–51. 
165 See Jorgensen, supra note 13, at 563. 
166 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 51; Brian D. Wright, The 
Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 691 (1983). 
167 See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1045 
(2005). 
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ensured by the patent system to a regulatory market-exclusivity 
that will become part of the FDA market entry drug process. 
Before these proposed alternatives are addressed, it is 
necessary to acknowledge how the patent system should be 
reformed in a way that better accommodates pharmaceuticals.  The 
long development cycles, approval cycles, and heavy regulations 
on patented pharmaceuticals distinguish them from other types of 
products with shorter development cycles or that are subject to less 
regulation.  In fact, the “one size fits all” approach adopted by 
many intellectual property laws, and patent laws in particular, has 
been met with strong criticism.168  Integrating Patent law more 
harmoniously with the pharmaceutical industry may prove to be an 
inconvenient and time-consuming undertaking169 that is not as 
efficient as other proposed alternatives.  Moreover, reforming 
Patent law so that it better serves the pharmaceutical industry may 
be unfair to other industries and, more pressingly, violates the 
WTO TRIPS agreement that ensures that patent protection is 
enforced in a way that is nondiscriminatory with respect to “the 
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products 
are imported or locally produced.”170  Furthermore, creating a 
patent that is specific to the pharmaceutical industry—thereby 
rendering such patents similar to design patents—is an undertaking 
that would likely take years of reform, thus providing no 
immediate benefit to the pharmaceutical industry.  This naturally 
presents a problem in light of the time-sensitive nature of the need 
for, and social benefit provided by, pharmaceuticals.  Instead, a 
different incentive program or set of FDA regulations would better 
resolve the conflicts presented by the patent system as it currently 
relates to the pharmaceutical industry. 
                                                                                                             
168 See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 71 (“Each IP regime should cover 
subject matter with similar needs for protection, especially if heterogeneous needs cannot 
be remedied by courts.  Many controversies arise because of heterogeneity within IP 
regimes.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 364 (“But the needs of these fields for 
patent protection differ greatly, making it difficult to fine-tune the patent laws to meet the 
needs of the pharmaceutical industry without upsetting the balance of protection and 
competition in other industries.”). 
169 See Thomas, supra note 36, at 542. 
170 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
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A. Rewards-Based Incentives 
For over thirty years, it has been recognized that patents are not 
necessarily the best incentive for innovation.171  There has been 
significant debate over the benefit that the exclusivity incentives of 
patents truly provide, suggesting that perhaps rewards-based 
incentive programs are better suited for sparking innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry.172  As discussed in Part II, the 
requirements of patent protection do not allow for free and full 
innovation because such requirements effectively bar the use of 
certain drugs due to their patent ineligibility, even including those 
that may prove to be the most likely to succeed.  Accordingly, it is 
important to invest in an incentive program that allows total usage 
of all drugs, rewarding those that provide heightened social value 
instead of those that are simply novel and non-obvious. 
In response to an urge to make use of “technology inducement 
prizes”173 as well as Congress’s clear grant of authority to offer 
prizes,174 various government agencies have awarded millions of 
dollars in prizes to reward and incentivize innovation.175  Rewards 
systems pay innovators directly, thus incentivizing innovation 
                                                                                                             
171 See Wright, supra note 166, at 69. 
172 See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48; Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 34, at 
1951; Kapczynski et al., supra note 167, at 1045 (“Economists have long debated 
whether direct government funding or prize systems would have better welfare effects 
than patents.”); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation 
4–9 (Jan. 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf (“Because pharmaceutical markets 
function poorly, the patent system does not effectively stimulate drug research and 
development.  Instead, it induces large amounts of research into drugs with relatively 
little incremental therapeutic value, while providing inadequate incentives to innovate in 
some areas of great therapeutic value.”). 
173 See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT 
PRIZES IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE, app. A. at 1–2 (1999) (defining each term). 
174 See America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, H.R. 5116, 111th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2011) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3719 (2012)) (granting agencies the authority to 
“carry out a program to award prizes competitively to stimulate innovation that has the 
potential to advance the mission of [each] respective agency”).  President Obama has also 
recently urged agencies to make use of their ability to offer rewards as an incentive for 
innovation. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: 
SECURING OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 12 (2011). 
175 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 308 (2013). 
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without providing a monopolistic advantage.176  Instead of 
providing an exclusivity period to make up for the money 
expended during R&D and clinical testing, grants awarded to 
innovative drugs could support those costs on the front end, while 
prizes awarded could reward and supplement that costly 
development process post-market entry.177  Furthermore, reward 
systems redistribute the source of the money provided to the 
innovator from the consumer, who benefits from the product 
(through purchase), to the government.178  Under a rewards system, 
the government and interested agencies could incentivize 
innovation in a number of different ways.179  One reward includes 
offering a prize for the first creator of a certain kind of drug.  
Another reward is a grant to decrease the costs of R&D for drugs 
that target certain illnesses or demonstrate a high likelihood of 
success.  A third such reward is a tax credit on the costs of R&D.  
The timing of a reward system varies and thus differs from the 
patent system in a meaningful way.  Although the benefit of such 
rewards, like patents, are reaped after R&D because they are 
granted to innovators who actually prove successful, grants and tax 
incentives depart from this condition of Patent law because they 
are typically awarded before R&D occurs (and not as a retroactive 
reimbursement).180 
                                                                                                             
176 See Steven Shavell et al., Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 525, 525 (2001). 
177 See Jorgensen, supra note 13, at 563 (citing Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical 
Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113 
(2012)). 
178 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 308.  Importantly, some of the funding 
for rewards may come from independent agencies or private donors, while in the case of 
government grants, for example, this really just means the wealth distribution comes from 
taxpayers. See id. at 345. 
179 For a detailed discussion and monetary breakdown of an example of what each of 
the many suggestions for a rewards-incentive program looks like, see Hemel & Ouellette, 
supra note 175, at 311–12.  This discussion also reveals a cost-benefit analysis of each of 
these rewards, acknowledging what each has that the others may be lacking. See id.  
Further, the article suggests how to assess the amount of money for each reward based on 
the likelihood of success or demand for the drug. Id.  This Note acknowledges the 
difficulty involved in assessing a monetary reward amount. See, e.g., Shavell et al., supra 
note 176 (although specific considerations that should be taken into account to price each 
reward are outside the scope of this Note). 
180 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 333. 
2014] THE NEED FOR PATENT REFORM IN PHARMACEUTICALS 1093 
One concern for a rewards system is the difficulty involved in 
calculating the amount of money to be offered in each reward.  
Although this challenge is more difficult with prize rewards than 
tax credits or grants, the government simply does not have enough 
information at the early stage of R&D—that is, when rewards 
would be offered—to devise an appropriate reward.181  This 
component of a rewards-based system makes patents seem more 
favorable, because the benefit of patents directly correlates to the 
success of the product once it is on the market.182  Notably, 
however, a rewards-based system could simply be made “to value 
a project’s inputs rather than its outputs,”183 relying on the profits 
the pharmaceutical product brings its creator due to its market 
success to reflect the value of the outputs.184 
Another concern is that completely replacing the patent system 
with a rewards-based system hurts pharmaceutical innovators, 
because issuing a set reward and denying all market exclusivity 
leaves no room for unexpected additional profits.  However, being 
the first to create a pharmaceutical product still provides a creator 
with a competitive advantage.185  Even if generic companies can 
figure out how to copy the pharmaceutical product through reverse 
engineering or otherwise, the original creators may still enjoy a 
high level of profitability simply because those creators are the 
brand-name makers of that product.186  Accordingly, a rewards-
based program can be used to incentivize pharmaceutical 
innovation while still preserving the profits generated by being the 
first and the best in the market. 
                                                                                                             
181 See Shavell et al., supra note 175, at 526. 
182 See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 70. 
183 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 314. 
184 In an ideal world, social value could be calculated in a way that the prize could 
easily reflect its worth. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 70 (“Prizes could 
serve the same purposes if the size of the prize could be linked to the social value but 
without the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing.”). 
185 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 310. 
186 See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 340 
(1992) (discussing that findings revealed that, despite the fact that brand-name drug 
prices triple generic drug prices, brand-name drugs still retain approximately fifty percent 
of their market share two years after generic entry). 
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B. Regulatory Exclusivities 
With respect to the pharmaceutical industry, the patent system 
and the FDA regulatory approval process are in disharmony.  The 
patent process does not sufficiently account for the elements of the 
FDA approval process and their impact on the pharmaceutical 
industry in a way that makes the effective patent term worthwhile.  
Because there are already other regulatory exclusivities,187 it is 
conceivable that the FDA can simply extend its control over the 
pharmaceutical industry in a way that includes the incentives for 
innovation currently received through the intellectual property 
component.  Furthermore, it is the FDA’s current regulatory 
approval process that shortens the patent term and makes the 
opportunity for excludability without a patent less likely due to the 
substantial information disclosure requirements.  Accordingly, it is 
within the FDA’s authority to regulate market excludability for 
pharmaceuticals due to the inevitable influence of the FDA on the 
industry.188 
Regulatory exclusivities administered by the FDA can be used 
in a way that enhances innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry.189  Like patent protection, regulatory exclusivities can be 
designed to grant pharmaceutical innovators periods of exclusivity 
in the market, as well as over their information in general.  If their 
scope is broadened and their effects are heightened, regulatory 
exclusivities can serve as the protection and security—analogous 
to the patent protection on which the pharmaceutical industry 
currently relies—to ensure returned investments and offer promise 
for sufficient profitability. 
The pharmaceutical industry already enjoys certain kinds of 
regulatory exclusivities administered by the FDA.190  For example, 
                                                                                                             
187 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 360–61 (discussing the role that the FDA already 
plays in issuing patent extensions by the use of its regulatory authority, and terming these 
regulatory exclusivities “pseudo patents”). 
188 The pharmaceutical industry has long argued that the period of time spent 
performing clinical testing for FDA approval should be returned to them in the form of 
additional market exclusivity. See Patent Hearings, supra note 159. 
189 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348. 
190 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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the FDCA grants drug innovators five years of data exclusivity.191  
Data exclusivities prevent generic drug companies from relying on 
the clinical trial data and drug information produced by the original 
drug maker to obtain FDA approval once the original patent has 
expired.  The FDA also administers market exclusivities, which 
bear an even stronger relation to the limited monopoly granted by 
patent protection.192  Regulatory market exclusivities like these 
appear in the Orphan Drug Act193 and the pediatric provision in the 
FDAMA.194  Naturally, market exclusivities grant stronger 
protection for the innovator because they bar other companies from 
entering into the market at all, whereas data exclusivity still 
enables market entry to drug companies who invest in their own 
clinical trials and drug testing.195 
Regulatory market exclusivities are a better approach than 
patent protections, because they fill the gaps left by patent law and 
allow for necessary “fine tuning” to the pharmaceutical industry 
without disrupting other patentable markets.196  Importantly, 
regulatory market exclusivities include protection for the products 
that are left behind and rendered unpatentable due to the problems 
that lie within the useful, novel, and non-obviousness requirements 
addressed in Part III.  As noted, the patent requirements are not 
appropriate when applied to the pharmaceutical industry because 
they do not account for the social value that is provided by a drug 
deemed unpatentable by these strict standards.  Consequently, they 
force pharmaceutical innovators to tip-toe around the rigidity of 
patentability standards, often foregoing what would be the more 
socially beneficial approach to safeguard the possibility that their 
innovations will receive the protection they need to be worth the 
                                                                                                             
191 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).  However, the actual effective period of market 
exclusivity afforded by this data exclusivity regulation is not generally viewed as long 
enough to sufficiently incentivize innovation and investment into drug development.  See 
Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between 
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 487 (2008). 
192 See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 123 
193 See Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 
360aa–ee). 
194 See Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127, 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997). 
195 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348. 
196 See id. at 364. 
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investment.  In practice, innovators often must avoid using any 
drugs that might be deemed unpatentable,197 even if the possibility 
exists that the avoided drug is the best-known option.  
Furthermore, patentability standards also discourage innovators 
from disclosing experimental failures for fear that such disclosure 
might damage their chances of patenting certain drugs in the future 
due to lack of novelty.  This is problematic because such drug 
information is helpful in promoting efficiency198 and fostering 
innovation.199  In addressing this concern, FDA regulatory market 
exclusivities could replace patent protection in a way that would 
close this gap.  Instead of affording protection to products for 
meeting standards that ignore the reason pharmaceutical 
innovation is so important to this country, regulatory exclusivities 
are designed to protect products that are socially valuable.200 
Regulatory market exclusivities are also more appropriate in 
light of the pharmaceutical development process.201  Because the 
time and cost of the stringent FDA standards for approval for 
market entry often cut into the effective patent term,202 it seems 
                                                                                                             
197 See Roin, supra note 22, at 503 (“The novelty and non[-]obviousness requirements 
make no concession for the development costs of inventions and thus cause patents to be 
withheld from drugs that are unlikely to reach the public without that protection.”). 
198 See Seymore, supra note 111, at 955–56 (“At minimum, the disclosure saves time 
and money by preventing the repetition of dead-end experiments.”). 
199 See id. (“There is indeed hope that reading the details of the failed experiment will 
induce innovative thinking to solve that specific problem or others.”). 
200 See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049; Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585; Pediatric Exclusivity Incentive in the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, PL 105–115, Nov. 21, 1997, 111 Stat 2296, §505(A), for 
marked examples of regulatory exclusivity extensions for drugs that are valuable or 
needed; see also STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85 (strategic Plan to 
expedite approval of drugs on drug shortage list); America COMPETES Reauthorization 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, §105, 124 Stat. 3982, 3989-93 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
3719) (granting agencies the authority to “carry out a program to award prizes 
competitively to stimulate innovation that has the potential to advance the mission of 
[each] respective agency”); see also supra note 174 (providing examples of regulatory 
incentives awarded to drugs that are valuable or needed). 
201 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 351–53. 
202 Although the Hatch–Waxman Act seeks to address this conflict by giving 
pharmaceutical patents term extensions for up to five years due to delays in the regulatory 
approval process, the approval process often compromises much longer than five years of 
the patent term, and regulatory approval delays are not the only factors that cut into the 
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more sensible for the FDA to administer the term for market 
exclusivity.  The interplay between the length of the FDA approval 
process and the patent term creates a paradoxical situation for 
pharmaceutical innovators who are forced to choose between a 
drug that may have a greater benefit to the public but guarantee a 
longer clinical testing period, and drugs that are more likely to 
have a shorter clinical trial period but may not be as socially 
valuable.203  In response, regulatory exclusivities are more suitable 
than patents because regulatory exclusivity periods “typically do 
not begin until a product is on the market,”204 in contrast with a 
patent term that begins at the time the patent application is filed.205  
Furthermore, the period of market exclusivity provided to drug 
companies is uniform under a regulatory regime, rewarding 
pharmaceutical innovators in the same way for investing in 
effective health products that serve to benefit the public.206 
An example of this type of regulatory market exclusivity 
appears in the Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation 
and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 2013 (“MODDERN Cures 
Act of 2013”),207 which was introduced on September 17, 2013, 
and promotes using regulatory exclusivities over patent law.  The 
bill specifically acknowledged findings that the lack of 
development of potentially valuable drugs is due to 
“insufficiencies” in the patent-protection system and, therefore, 
seeks to remedy that problem by supplementing—and perhaps 
                                                                                                             
patent term. See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20; see also 
Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and 
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–76 (2004). 
203 See Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-on Biologics 
Legislation: FDA Exclusivity As an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 93, 106 (2010); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 161, at 300 
(discussing that, despite the correlation between the costs of R&D and the degree of 
patent protection needed to adequately incentivize development, the patent system does 
not tailor patent protection to the costs of R&D). 
204 Thomas, supra note 36, at 542. 
205 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
206 See Morgan, supra note 203, at 105–06 (suggesting a uniform approach, and noting 
that most ideally, exclusivity time periods would be tailored to the time and costs of 
clinical research and development). 
207 H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
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replacing—patent protection with regulatory exclusivities.208  For 
example, one component of the proposed legislation includes 
extending the exclusivity period for drugs that address unmet 
medical needs (“dormant therapies”), giving such drugs an 
additional fifteen years of data exclusivity.209  Furthermore, the bill 
provides the opportunity to extend the patents on approved drugs 
that qualify as dormant therapies.210  The MODDERN Cures Act 
of 2013 also provides for an extension of the exclusivity of drugs 
that demonstrate—through diagnostic testing—applicability to a 
certain patient population.211  Lastly, the bill directs the Secretary 
to engage with appropriate authorities in an analysis of current 
intellectual property protection laws governing pharmaceuticals to 
determine the best way to shape those laws to enhance necessary 
development.212  Importantly, the bill is broader than the kinds of 
regulatory exclusivities that would be needed to completely 
overcome patent law, the details of which are outside the scope of 
this Note.  Furthermore, it is also in an early stage and may stand 
to face a great deal of opposition.  Nonetheless, the MODDERN 
Cures Act of 2013 represents a significant shift in the area of 
pharmaceutical protection and innovation, and remains a relevant 
example of the direction the pharmaceutical industry may take 
over years to come. 
CONCLUSION 
A review and reform of the way that the pharmaceutical 
industry is protected and pharmaceutical innovation is incentivized 
is long overdue.  Innovation in this industry is essential, and it is 
necessary that the incentives designed to fuel innovation take into 
account the way the industry functions.  In this regard, the patent 
system fails to serve its intended purpose.  Any reforms that are 
implemented should account for the cost and time inherent in the 
R&D process as well as the social value of pharmaceutical 
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innovation to the public.  Ultimately, such reforms would enable 
the development of desirable and effective pharmaceutical 
products while providing room for creative and inventive research 
that is not restricted or restrained by the stringent standards of the 
patent system. 
 
